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authorEric Snow <ericsnowcurrently@gmail.com>2017-05-22 21:36:03 -0700
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2017-05-22 21:36:03 -0700
commit6b4be195cd8868b76eb6fbe166acc39beee8ce36 (patch)
treebbab44fad32c576b9eb7e4b83368e200adc33f00 /Python/random.c
parentf9169ce6b48c7cc7cc62d9eb5e4ee1ac7066d14b (diff)
downloadcpython-6b4be195cd8868b76eb6fbe166acc39beee8ce36.tar.gz
cpython-6b4be195cd8868b76eb6fbe166acc39beee8ce36.zip
bpo-22257: Small changes for PEP 432. (#1728)
PEP 432 specifies a number of large changes to interpreter startup code, including exposing a cleaner C-API. The major changes depend on a number of smaller changes. This patch includes all those smaller changes.
Diffstat (limited to 'Python/random.c')
-rw-r--r--Python/random.c599
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 599 deletions
diff --git a/Python/random.c b/Python/random.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c97d5e71002..00000000000
--- a/Python/random.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
-#include "Python.h"
-#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
-# include <windows.h>
-/* All sample MSDN wincrypt programs include the header below. It is at least
- * required with Min GW. */
-# include <wincrypt.h>
-#else
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# endif
-# ifdef HAVE_LINUX_RANDOM_H
-# include <linux/random.h>
-# endif
-# if defined(HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H) && (defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY))
-# include <sys/random.h>
-# endif
-# if !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) && defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM_SYSCALL)
-# include <sys/syscall.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifdef Py_DEBUG
-int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
-#else
-static int _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 0;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
-static HCRYPTPROV hCryptProv = 0;
-
-static int
-win32_urandom_init(int raise)
-{
- /* Acquire context */
- if (!CryptAcquireContext(&hCryptProv, NULL, NULL,
- PROV_RSA_FULL, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT))
- goto error;
-
- return 0;
-
-error:
- if (raise) {
- PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by the Windows CryptoGen
- API. Return 0 on success, or raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
-static int
-win32_urandom(unsigned char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
-{
- Py_ssize_t chunk;
-
- if (hCryptProv == 0)
- {
- if (win32_urandom_init(raise) == -1) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- while (size > 0)
- {
- chunk = size > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : size;
- if (!CryptGenRandom(hCryptProv, (DWORD)chunk, buffer))
- {
- /* CryptGenRandom() failed */
- if (raise) {
- PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(0);
- }
- return -1;
- }
- buffer += chunk;
- size -= chunk;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-#else /* !MS_WINDOWS */
-
-#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM) || defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM_SYSCALL)
-#define PY_GETRANDOM 1
-
-/* Call getrandom() to get random bytes:
-
- - Return 1 on success
- - Return 0 if getrandom() is not available (failed with ENOSYS or EPERM),
- or if getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) failed with EAGAIN (system urandom not
- initialized yet) and raise=0.
- - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
- if getrandom() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
- handler raised an exception, or if getrandom() failed with a different
- error.
-
- getrandom() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
-static int
-py_getrandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int blocking, int raise)
-{
- /* Is getrandom() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if getrandom()
- failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. Need Linux kernel 3.17 or newer, or Solaris
- 11.3 or newer */
- static int getrandom_works = 1;
- int flags;
- char *dest;
- long n;
-
- if (!getrandom_works) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- flags = blocking ? 0 : GRND_NONBLOCK;
- dest = buffer;
- while (0 < size) {
-#ifdef sun
- /* Issue #26735: On Solaris, getrandom() is limited to returning up
- to 1024 bytes. Call it multiple times if more bytes are
- requested. */
- n = Py_MIN(size, 1024);
-#else
- n = Py_MIN(size, LONG_MAX);
-#endif
-
- errno = 0;
-#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
- if (raise) {
- Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
- n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
- Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
- }
- else {
- n = getrandom(dest, n, flags);
- }
-#else
- /* On Linux, use the syscall() function because the GNU libc doesn't
- expose the Linux getrandom() syscall yet. See:
- https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17252 */
- if (raise) {
- Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
- n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
- Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
- }
- else {
- n = syscall(SYS_getrandom, dest, n, flags);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (n < 0) {
- /* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the kernel.
- EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
- or something else. */
- if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
- getrandom_works = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) fails with EAGAIN if the system urandom
- is not initialiazed yet. For _PyRandom_Init(), we ignore the
- error and fall back on reading /dev/urandom which never blocks,
- even if the system urandom is not initialized yet:
- see the PEP 524. */
- if (errno == EAGAIN && !raise && !blocking) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (errno == EINTR) {
- if (raise) {
- if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* retry getrandom() if it was interrupted by a signal */
- continue;
- }
-
- if (raise) {
- PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- dest += n;
- size -= n;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#elif defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY)
-#define PY_GETENTROPY 1
-
-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes generated by getentropy():
-
- - Return 1 on success
- - Return 0 if getentropy() syscall is not available (failed with ENOSYS or
- EPERM).
- - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error:
- if getentropy() failed with EINTR, raise is non-zero and the Python signal
- handler raised an exception, or if getentropy() failed with a different
- error.
-
- getentropy() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal. */
-static int
-py_getentropy(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
-{
- /* Is getentropy() supported by the running kernel? Set to 0 if
- getentropy() failed with ENOSYS or EPERM. */
- static int getentropy_works = 1;
-
- if (!getentropy_works) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (size > 0) {
- /* getentropy() is limited to returning up to 256 bytes. Call it
- multiple times if more bytes are requested. */
- Py_ssize_t len = Py_MIN(size, 256);
- int res;
-
- if (raise) {
- Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
- res = getentropy(buffer, len);
- Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
- }
- else {
- res = getentropy(buffer, len);
- }
-
- if (res < 0) {
- /* ENOSYS: the syscall is not supported by the running kernel.
- EPERM: the syscall is blocked by a security policy (ex: SECCOMP)
- or something else. */
- if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM) {
- getentropy_works = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (errno == EINTR) {
- if (raise) {
- if (PyErr_CheckSignals()) {
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- /* retry getentropy() if it was interrupted by a signal */
- continue;
- }
-
- if (raise) {
- PyErr_SetFromErrno(PyExc_OSError);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- buffer += len;
- size -= len;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_GETENTROPY) && !defined(sun) */
-
-
-static struct {
- int fd;
- dev_t st_dev;
- ino_t st_ino;
-} urandom_cache = { -1 };
-
-/* Read random bytes from the /dev/urandom device:
-
- - Return 0 on success
- - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
-
- Possible causes of errors:
-
- - open() failed with ENOENT, ENXIO, ENODEV, EACCES: the /dev/urandom device
- was not found. For example, it was removed manually or not exposed in a
- chroot or container.
- - open() failed with a different error
- - fstat() failed
- - read() failed or returned 0
-
- read() is retried if it failed with EINTR: interrupted by a signal.
-
- The file descriptor of the device is kept open between calls to avoid using
- many file descriptors when run in parallel from multiple threads:
- see the issue #18756.
-
- st_dev and st_ino fields of the file descriptor (from fstat()) are cached to
- check if the file descriptor was replaced by a different file (which is
- likely a bug in the application): see the issue #21207.
-
- If the file descriptor was closed or replaced, open a new file descriptor
- but don't close the old file descriptor: it probably points to something
- important for some third-party code. */
-static int
-dev_urandom(char *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int raise)
-{
- int fd;
- Py_ssize_t n;
-
- if (raise) {
- struct _Py_stat_struct st;
-
- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
- /* Does the fd point to the same thing as before? (issue #21207) */
- if (_Py_fstat_noraise(urandom_cache.fd, &st)
- || st.st_dev != urandom_cache.st_dev
- || st.st_ino != urandom_cache.st_ino) {
- /* Something changed: forget the cached fd (but don't close it,
- since it probably points to something important for some
- third-party code). */
- urandom_cache.fd = -1;
- }
- }
- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0)
- fd = urandom_cache.fd;
- else {
- fd = _Py_open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENXIO ||
- errno == ENODEV || errno == EACCES) {
- PyErr_SetString(PyExc_NotImplementedError,
- "/dev/urandom (or equivalent) not found");
- }
- /* otherwise, keep the OSError exception raised by _Py_open() */
- return -1;
- }
- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
- /* urandom_fd was initialized by another thread while we were
- not holding the GIL, keep it. */
- close(fd);
- fd = urandom_cache.fd;
- }
- else {
- if (_Py_fstat(fd, &st)) {
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
- else {
- urandom_cache.fd = fd;
- urandom_cache.st_dev = st.st_dev;
- urandom_cache.st_ino = st.st_ino;
- }
- }
- }
-
- do {
- n = _Py_read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
- if (n == -1)
- return -1;
- if (n == 0) {
- PyErr_Format(PyExc_RuntimeError,
- "Failed to read %zi bytes from /dev/urandom",
- size);
- return -1;
- }
-
- buffer += n;
- size -= n;
- } while (0 < size);
- }
- else {
- fd = _Py_open_noraise("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- while (0 < size)
- {
- do {
- n = read(fd, buffer, (size_t)size);
- } while (n < 0 && errno == EINTR);
-
- if (n <= 0) {
- /* stop on error or if read(size) returned 0 */
- close(fd);
- return -1;
- }
-
- buffer += n;
- size -= n;
- }
- close(fd);
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void
-dev_urandom_close(void)
-{
- if (urandom_cache.fd >= 0) {
- close(urandom_cache.fd);
- urandom_cache.fd = -1;
- }
-}
-#endif /* !MS_WINDOWS */
-
-
-/* Fill buffer with pseudo-random bytes generated by a linear congruent
- generator (LCG):
-
- x(n+1) = (x(n) * 214013 + 2531011) % 2^32
-
- Use bits 23..16 of x(n) to generate a byte. */
-static void
-lcg_urandom(unsigned int x0, unsigned char *buffer, size_t size)
-{
- size_t index;
- unsigned int x;
-
- x = x0;
- for (index=0; index < size; index++) {
- x *= 214013;
- x += 2531011;
- /* modulo 2 ^ (8 * sizeof(int)) */
- buffer[index] = (x >> 16) & 0xff;
- }
-}
-
-/* Read random bytes:
-
- - Return 0 on success
- - Raise an exception (if raise is non-zero) and return -1 on error
-
- Used sources of entropy ordered by preference, preferred source first:
-
- - CryptGenRandom() on Windows
- - getrandom() function (ex: Linux and Solaris): call py_getrandom()
- - getentropy() function (ex: OpenBSD): call py_getentropy()
- - /dev/urandom device
-
- Read from the /dev/urandom device if getrandom() or getentropy() function
- is not available or does not work.
-
- Prefer getrandom() over getentropy() because getrandom() supports blocking
- and non-blocking mode: see the PEP 524. Python requires non-blocking RNG at
- startup to initialize its hash secret, but os.urandom() must block until the
- system urandom is initialized (at least on Linux 3.17 and newer).
-
- Prefer getrandom() and getentropy() over reading directly /dev/urandom
- because these functions don't need file descriptors and so avoid ENFILE or
- EMFILE errors (too many open files): see the issue #18756.
-
- Only the getrandom() function supports non-blocking mode.
-
- Only use RNG running in the kernel. They are more secure because it is
- harder to get the internal state of a RNG running in the kernel land than a
- RNG running in the user land. The kernel has a direct access to the hardware
- and has access to hardware RNG, they are used as entropy sources.
-
- Note: the OpenSSL RAND_pseudo_bytes() function does not automatically reseed
- its RNG on fork(), two child processes (with the same pid) generate the same
- random numbers: see issue #18747. Kernel RNGs don't have this issue,
- they have access to good quality entropy sources.
-
- If raise is zero:
-
- - Don't raise an exception on error
- - Don't call the Python signal handler (don't call PyErr_CheckSignals()) if
- a function fails with EINTR: retry directly the interrupted function
- - Don't release the GIL to call functions.
-*/
-static int
-pyurandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size, int blocking, int raise)
-{
-#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
- int res;
-#endif
-
- if (size < 0) {
- if (raise) {
- PyErr_Format(PyExc_ValueError,
- "negative argument not allowed");
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (size == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
-#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
- return win32_urandom((unsigned char *)buffer, size, raise);
-#else
-
-#if defined(PY_GETRANDOM) || defined(PY_GETENTROPY)
-#ifdef PY_GETRANDOM
- res = py_getrandom(buffer, size, blocking, raise);
-#else
- res = py_getentropy(buffer, size, raise);
-#endif
- if (res < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (res == 1) {
- return 0;
- }
- /* getrandom() or getentropy() function is not available: failed with
- ENOSYS or EPERM. Fall back on reading from /dev/urandom. */
-#endif
-
- return dev_urandom(buffer, size, raise);
-#endif
-}
-
-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
- number generator (RNG). It is suitable for most cryptographic purposes
- except long living private keys for asymmetric encryption.
-
- On Linux 3.17 and newer, the getrandom() syscall is used in blocking mode:
- block until the system urandom entropy pool is initialized (128 bits are
- collected by the kernel).
-
- Return 0 on success. Raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
-int
-_PyOS_URandom(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
-{
- return pyurandom(buffer, size, 1, 1);
-}
-
-/* Fill buffer with size pseudo-random bytes from the operating system random
- number generator (RNG). It is not suitable for cryptographic purpose.
-
- On Linux 3.17 and newer (when getrandom() syscall is used), if the system
- urandom is not initialized yet, the function returns "weak" entropy read
- from /dev/urandom.
-
- Return 0 on success. Raise an exception and return -1 on error. */
-int
-_PyOS_URandomNonblock(void *buffer, Py_ssize_t size)
-{
- return pyurandom(buffer, size, 0, 1);
-}
-
-void
-_PyRandom_Init(void)
-{
- char *env;
- unsigned char *secret = (unsigned char *)&_Py_HashSecret.uc;
- Py_ssize_t secret_size = sizeof(_Py_HashSecret_t);
- Py_BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(_Py_HashSecret_t) == sizeof(_Py_HashSecret.uc));
-
- if (_Py_HashSecret_Initialized)
- return;
- _Py_HashSecret_Initialized = 1;
-
- /*
- Hash randomization is enabled. Generate a per-process secret,
- using PYTHONHASHSEED if provided.
- */
-
- env = Py_GETENV("PYTHONHASHSEED");
- if (env && *env != '\0' && strcmp(env, "random") != 0) {
- char *endptr = env;
- unsigned long seed;
- seed = strtoul(env, &endptr, 10);
- if (*endptr != '\0'
- || seed > 4294967295UL
- || (errno == ERANGE && seed == ULONG_MAX))
- {
- Py_FatalError("PYTHONHASHSEED must be \"random\" or an integer "
- "in range [0; 4294967295]");
- }
- if (seed == 0) {
- /* disable the randomized hash */
- memset(secret, 0, secret_size);
- }
- else {
- lcg_urandom(seed, secret, secret_size);
- }
- }
- else {
- int res;
-
- /* _PyRandom_Init() is called very early in the Python initialization
- and so exceptions cannot be used (use raise=0).
-
- _PyRandom_Init() must not block Python initialization: call
- pyurandom() is non-blocking mode (blocking=0): see the PEP 524. */
- res = pyurandom(secret, secret_size, 0, 0);
- if (res < 0) {
- Py_FatalError("failed to get random numbers to initialize Python");
- }
- }
-}
-
-void
-_PyRandom_Fini(void)
-{
-#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
- if (hCryptProv) {
- CryptReleaseContext(hCryptProv, 0);
- hCryptProv = 0;
- }
-#else
- dev_urandom_close();
-#endif
-}